With a few notable exceptions, 1 it has become almost conventional wisdom to assume that a nuclear Iran is bad for its immediate neighbors, the wider Middle East region, and even the world.
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However, the international community -notably the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United States and especially Israel remain unconvinced that the program is entirely peaceful. In spite of this, Iran remains a signatory of the NPT (signed in 1968) -unlike India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan (all possessing nuclear weapons 10 ), which are not.
The Iranian position is complicated by the central bargain at the heart of the NPT.
Essentially the treaty seeks to aid the development of nuclear technology for civilian purposes, such as power generation and medical research, but at the same time forbids any member from building or acquiring nuclear weapons. The problem is that what is required for civilian nuclear power -up to 20 percent enriched uranium 235 -uses broadly the same techniques as that needed for a nuclear bomb: roughly 90 percent enriched uranium 235.
While the uranium fissile material is not the only thing needed for a bomb, the fact that Iran has demonstrated the ability to enrich uranium at all presents the possibility that it could enrich to weapons-grade. Because of this, Iran is currently described as a "latent" nuclear power, one that could -if it chose to -produce a nuclear bomb within a relatively short Nicoullaud has suggest that "…the actions I believe he took in 2003 raise hopes that as president of the Islamic Republic he will be able to find and implement a negotiated solution for the continuing nuclear crisis." 12 In November 2013, Iran agreed to a deal with the P5+1 13 to suspended uranium enrichment in return for much-needed sanctions relief. Under the so-called Geneva Agreement, Iran temporarily agreed to limit levels of uranium enrichment (to a maximum of 5 percent U235), cease building any new enrichment or reprocessing facilities, and open up its nuclear infrastructure to inspection by the IAEA. 14 Initially, the deal was planned to last for six months, designed to provide space for a more comprehensive bargain.In early April 2015, a second "interim deal" was agree between the US, EU and Iran, whereby Iran agreed to; dilute or ship abroad its stockpile of enriched uranium; cease fissile material production at Fordow; render the Arak reactor incapable of producing weapons grade plutonium, and agree to heavy international scrutiny at Natanz. In return, most nuclear related sanctions against Iran would be dropped, but only once the IAEA confirms that these obligations have been fulfilled. 15 While the deal has been heralded as a great breakthrough, a number of significant issues and complications remain to be addressed before the 30 June deadline for a comprehensive agreement. 16 At the time of writing, However, at the time of this writing, no comprehensive pact has been agreed on, but negotiations continue in earnest. Iran probably has enough low-enriched uranium to convert to weapons grade in order to make a nuclear bomb if it chose to and is believed to have worked on various weaponization and warhead designs. 17 As a result, the international community remains deeply concerned about the trajectory of developments over the past decade inside Iran and what this may mean for the future of the region.
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The Iranian nuclear program has been viewed almost unequivocally as a dangerous and destabilizing development and has already led to widespread planning for the "worst case" scenario: an Iranian nuclear weapon. As Ray Takeyh and James Lindsay explain:
The nightmare scenario that could be unleashed by Iran's nuclearization is easy to sketch. Israel would go on a hair-trigger alert-ready to launch a nuclear weapon at a moment's noticeputting both countries minutes away from annihilation. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey would scramble to join the nuclear club.
The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) would collapse, unleashing a wave of nuclear proliferation around the globe.
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The threat is perhaps most pressingly felt in Israel, especially given the rhetoric of former
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that Israel should be "wiped off the map." 19 While the anti-Israeli tone is calmer now, Jerusalem remains very wary of developments inside Iran and has not ruled out a pre-emptive strike, should certain "red-lines" be crossed. The most obvious "threat" of the Iranian nuclear program therefore concerns Israel, as Eric Edelman et al. explain:
The greatest concern in the near term would be that an unstable
Iranian-Israeli nuclear contest would emerge, with a significant risk that either side would launch a first strike on the other despite the enormous risks and costs involved. 20 In addition, there is a widely held perception that a nuclear-armed Iran would also be emboldened in its regional meddling, leading to broader instability and insecurity. Indeed, the prospect of a nuclear Iran does not sit well with a whole host of other regional actors, for a wide range of other strategic reasons: Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in the west; the 7 Persian Gulf monarchies to the south; Pakistan to the east; and to the north, Turkey. Iranian actions have crossed traditional geopolitical, religious and to some extent ethnic divides and united these disparate interests.
REGIONAL REACTIONS, GROWING CONCERNS
Iran's apparent progress on its nuclear program over the past decade has produced considerable unease across the Middle East, with Israel and many Sunni Arab states viewing the possibility of (Shia) Iran achieving either an actual or latent nuclear capability to represent a significant strategic challenge. While the specifics of the threat differ across regional actors, there is a common theme: Iranian nuclear aspirations will be detrimental both to individual state security and to broader regional stability. 28 There have also been a number of assassinations of
Iranian scientists involved in the Iranian nuclear program; Israeli intelligence services are suspected of being behind these killings. 29 In response, Iran has been implicated in a number of terrorist acts against Israeli targets in various parts of the world. 30 It has also sought to bolster its support for Hezbollah and Palestinian nonstate actors, partly as a way of inflicting costs on Israel for its opposition to its nuclear program. 31 In sum, although relations between Israel and Iran had been hostile during the 1990s, it was the exposure of Iran's nuclear program in 2002 that sparked the intense strategic competition of the past decade.
The Iranian nuclear program has also created considerable concern among the region's Sunni Arab governments. Although these states have been much less public in their criticism of the Iranian nuclear program, due primarily to the domestic and regional political factors, there is much evidence to suggest that they too view the prospect of a nuclear Iran as a significant strategic challenge or even an outright threat. Much like the Israelis, Sunni Arab strategists believe that a nuclear capable Iran would be emboldened within the region to more aggressively challenge their interests in places such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain and the Palestinian territories. 32 There is also a concern among Sunni Arab governments that, 9 if Iran demonstrated its nuclear capability overtly, this would win Tehran considerable support from the region's Arab publics, who would view a nuclear Iran as a welcome challenge to Israel's nuclear monopoly. 33 The result has been an increasing effort by many Sunni Arab states to balance against Iran in order to undermine Tehran's progress on its nuclear program. Although Sunni Arab balancing behavior against Iran has been less overt than that conducted by Israel, there have nonetheless been a number of tangible instances.
Most notably, the Sunni Arab states have not publicly opposed economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure against Iran over its nuclear program. In fact, many Sunni Arab states have privately been staunch supporters of the sanctions regime and diplomatic pressure. 34 Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, in particular, have individually and collectively sought to exploit their close relationship with the United States in order to try to convince Washington to take robust action against Iran's nuclear program. Saudi Arabia has also sought to weaken Iran's economy -and therefore its ability to pursue its nuclear programby maintaining relatively high oil production in a bid to drive down prices. 35 Iran has responded by undertaking a more confrontational approach toward the Sunni Arab states, especially prior to the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011. Tehran has sought to make it harder for Sunni Arab governments to take robust action against its nuclear programme by seeking support for its aspirations on the Arab street. 36 Needless to say, such Iranian overtures were met with considerable suspicion and unease by Sunni Arab governments, and this served to further perpetuate and intensify growing Sunni-Arab-Iranian tensions and competition. As this reveals, the Iranian nuclear question has played a key role in driving tension and competition between Iran and the Sunni Arab states over the past decade. Of course, the Iranian nuclear program has not been the only factor undermining their relations, but it has been a critical factor and key source of division between Tehran and the Sunni Arab states.
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NEW STRATEGIC RELATIONS AND THE GROWTH OF REGIONAL STABILITY
While the Iranian nuclear issue continues to be a highly destabilizing dynamic with regard to Israeli-Iranian and Iranian-Sunni-Arab relations, it has also produced many important stabilizing regional effects. In particular, the perception of the Iranian nuclear program as a momentous and growing strategic threat has led directly to increased cooperation and coordination among the Sunni Arab states, something that has historically been difficult to achieve. Perhaps of even greater significance, the Iranian nuclear programme has also led to tangible and effective cooperation and coordination between Israel and the Arabia and Egypt cooperated and coordinated extensively on the nuclear issue, and their governments remain committed to working together to prevent regional instability. 55 Similarly, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan have worked in conjunction with one another diplomatically in order to push and prompt the major international powers -particularly the United States -to take robust action against Iran. 56 As a result, and though it has certainly served to destabilize Israeli-Iranian and Arab-Iranian relations, the Iranian nuclear program has had a number of stabilizing effects across the Middle East.
While such cooperation and coordination has sometimes been tacit and subtle, it has also been tangible. Therefore, the Iranian nuclear program can be seen to have created and induced a number of important stabilizing dynamics within the region. It is highly probable that such cooperation and coordination will continue (and deepen) in the event of Iran's achieving an actual or latent nuclear capability. Given their current perception of the Iranian nuclear program, it is highly likely that Israel or the Sunni Arab states would view a future nuclear-armed Iran as a much more serious threat, and therefore as the basis for continued diplomatic, intelligence and defense cooperation.
Of course, this not to suggest that a nuclear-capable Iran would be an entirely stabilizing development. Tehran could become emboldened and a destabilizing force across the Middle East, and would likely lead to further deterioration in Israeli-Iranian and SunniArab-Iranian relations. However, it is essential not just to analyse the likely foreign-policy trajectory of a nuclear-capable Iran, but also to be cognizant of the wider regional dynamics 15 and interstate relations that have stabilized and improved as a result of the Iranian nuclear issue more broadly. heavily involved in the diplomatic process. 57 However, so far at least, a comprehensive deal has not been brokered that would be acceptable to Iran, the region's major Middle Eastern states and the wider international community. Interestingly, while the possible ramifications of a nuclear Iran for regional security has received considerable attention and scrutiny, the implications of a comprehensive nuclear deal for Middle Eastern stability has received far less scholarly analysis. Instead, there is a widely held tacit assumption that a nuclear Iran would not be a stabilizing force. However, given the current cooperation that has taken hold among many major Middle Eastern states in response to the Iranian nuclear program, there is much evidence to suggest that a comprehensive nuclear agreement could, in fact, have certain wider destabilizing implications.
A NUCLEAR DEAL AND THE FUTURE REGIONAL BALANCE
It is certainly possible that a comprehensive nuclear deal would go some way toward improving Iranian-Sunni-Arab relations by defusing some current major tension. Similarly, a comprehensive nuclear deal that fully satisfied and reassured Israel might also lead to reduced Israeli-Iranian antagonism. This is not to say that these dynamics would be completely transformed, but rather that an issue that drives hostility and competition would 16 be removed, and this would likely result in a number of stabilizing benefits. However, a comprehensive nuclear deal (if indeed possible) could also entail certain destabilizing consequences. In particular, the regional cooperation generated as a result of the An Iranian nuclear deal is also likely to remove an important basis for Israeli-SunniArab cooperation. Certain Arab states might seek a broader Arab-Iranian rapprochement and could use the opportunity afforded by a deal to press more forcibly for international pressure on Israel to relinquish its nuclear arsenal and create a nuclear-free Middle East. 58 
CONCLUSION
It is perhaps a cliché to say that the Middle East is a complex region, but the ostensible pursuit of nuclear weapons by Iran has further complicated an already volatile part of the world, and in some unexpected ways. While it may be unpopular to point this out, there is evidence that the Iranian nuclear program has had some benefits for the region over the past decade. Primarily, it has helped facilitate a new period of stability based upon the relationships that have been forged to address the shared concern about Iran among a diverse range of states -a manifestation of classical power-balancing theory. Indeed, mutual concern about Iran has allowed former adversaries and erstwhile enemies to put aside some of their differences and address what is seen to be a much larger shared threat. The most obvious manifestation of this is between Israel and the Sunni Arab world, but it is also taking place along more traditional nation-state lines and between different Sunni Arab regimes. It 18 could be that, far from the proliferation domino effect predicted by some or the chaos of an emboldened Iran by others, the current crisis might have provided a certain level of stability that has been impossible to achieve through other mechanisms, despite extensive high-level diplomatic engagement.
Accordingly, while a comprehensive deal -acceptable to all -curtailing the Iranian nuclear program should be welcomed, we must be aware that failure to reach an agreement would not be a zero-sum outcome. Indeed, it is arguable that no deal might be better than a very weak deal that is seen to reward Iran for its behaviour. 59 For a mixture of reasons, the continuation of the status quo whereby Iran retains a latent nuclear capability -or even achieves full weaponization -may not be as bad as conventional wisdom would lead us to believe. A deal to curtail Iranian nuclear ambitions would certainly bolster the NPT and nuclear non-proliferation norms more generally, and is likely to improve relations between Iran and the international community, but it is also possible that such a deal would undermine the rapprochements and deepening links that have developed over the past decade in the region between erstwhile traditional foes. In the long run, a comprehensive deal might actually be to the detriment of broader regional stability. 5 The Atoms for Peace program was a U.S.-led initiative to supply civilian nuclear equipment for schools, hospitals and research throughout the world, begun in the early 1950s. 6 See, for example, Shahram Chubin, "Does Iran Want Nuclear Weapons?" Survival 37, no. 1 (1995):
